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Early Supposition Theory II

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Abstract
In 1981 I published an article called *Early Supposition Theory*. Then as now, the magisterial work on the subject was L.M. de Rijk's *Logica Modernorum*, and then as now any discussion of the topic would have to rely to a great extent on the texts published there. This means that many of the problems that existed then still remain, but a couple of important new studies and several new texts have been published in the meantime, so it may be time to try to take stock of the situation. I will first look at the origin of the term *suppositio* and then at the chronology of our source texts.

Keywords
supposition, appellation, *causa apparentiae, causa non existentiae*

1. Whence suppositio?

In 1981 I tried to weaken L.M. de Rijk's case for supposition in the logical sense being derived from Priscianic grammar, and more specifically his claim that in Priscian *suppositum* means 'grammatical subject'. I think I was reasonably successful on that score. I did not, however, deny that twelfth-century grammarians' use of *suppositum* was relevant, or that De Rijk's 'put as a subject' was a good translation of their *supponere*, but I suggested that a common idea underlay the grammatical and the logical use of *suppositum*, namely that the *suppositum* is or is claimed to be the bearer of a certain form: in the case of grammar the subject would then be called *suppositum* because it is claimed to be the bearer of the form indicated by the predicate; in the case of logic, the *supposita* of *homo* would be the individuals that bear the form of humanity, and which might be the bearers of whichever form is predicated of them in a sentence with *homo* for its subject. This idea of mine was not based on much hard evidence, but I continue to cherish it somehow.

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In 1987, however, Kneepkens with his usual meticulous care argued forcefully for the view that the logicians' use of *supponere* was developed from the grammatical use of *supponere verbo* with an understood *personam*, and that ultimately the grammarians' usage should be traced back to their mullings over a passage in Priscian[1] containing the word *suppositum*.[2] But he also demonstrated that the *suppositum–appositum* analysis of sentences is not as old as we had previously thought. One of the key passages in Peter Helias turned out to be a later interpolation, and generally speaking, the *suppositum–appositum* analysis only becomes prominent some time after the middle of the twelfth century. There remained a couple of places in which Peter used *supponere* in a relevant way, and, following a suggestion of Pinborg's,[3] Kneepkens proposed that Peter had borrowed the terminology from Gilbert the Porretan. De Libera's paper for the 1987 symposium added more information about the Porretan trail, and more recently, Valente has further investigated that part of the history of supposition.[4]

While Kneepkens was not very keen on my idea that the key idea is that something is the bearer of a form, his suggested connection to the Porretans was, in fact, grist to my mill. To the Porretans the metaphysics of form and bearer is quite central, and predicates introduce a form—substantial, accidental or individual—for the subject to bear.[5]

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1) Priscianus, *Institutiones grammaticee*, ed. Hertz (1855-1859), XVII, 3, 23.

2) See Kneepkens (1987), esp. pp. 341-342.

3) Pinborg (1968) and (1972), 47-49. See also Nielsen (1982), 105.

4) De Libera (1987), 455; Valente (2008), esp. 275 ff. See also Valente's contribution to this volume.

5) See, e.g., *Compendium logicae Porretanum* I, 23, ed. Ebbesen *et al.* (1983), 10-11. Also note the use of *suppositum* in I. 20, 9: 'Ratio cur dicatur demonstrationem cum nomine substantivo fungi loco proprii. Cum enim pronomen demonstrativum certum significet suppositum, ex vi demonstrationis determinat ipsum imitatione accidentium. Nomen vero substantivum adiunctum substantialem determinat proprietatem. Cum ergo sic discrete significat suppositum accidentialibus et substantialibus <proprietatibus> determinatum, quid amplius proprium nomen posset efficere?' See also III. 29, 52. Further Valente (2008a), 288 with footnote 41, in which she quotes a passage from Langton's commentary on the *Sentences*: 'Quidam tamen. Magister Gilebertus, quia omnis appositio formae est, et suppositio substantiae, et ideo haec vera 'tres personae sunt unus deus', i.e., unius deitatis. Ex parte vero suppositi vellet hoc nomen 'deus' supponere pro persona, et ideo hanc {*sc.* 'unus deus est tres personae'} dixit esse falsam sicut hanc 'una persona est tres personae'.' Note that when quoting Latin texts, edited and unedited alike, I impose my own orthography and punctuation.

As also stressed by Kneepkens, it is a striking feature of grammatical texts as well as of the logical ones from the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries that *supposita* are usually not linguistic items, but such extra-linguistic entities as the predication is about, usually signified and/or named by a grammatical subject term, but occasionally, as a *suppositum locutioni*, by other means, as for example the preposition *de* + the ablative in an utterance of the form *hoc dicitur de hominibus.* It is also a fact that, until well into the thirteenth century logicians—at least continental ones[6]—mainly speak about suppositing as something subject-terms do, and thus it can be a matter of discussion, sometimes, whether *homo supponit Ciceronem* or *supponit pro Cicerone* means 'the word *homo* stands for Cicero' or 'the word *homo* introduces Cicero as the subject of the verb of the sentence'. Usually it does not matter which interpretation you choose. To take an example from John Pagus:[7]

> Videtur quod terminus communis supponens verbo de praesenti non coartetur ad entia sed indifferenter supponit pro entibus et non entibus.

Here the common term *supponit verbo*, i.e., provides the verb with a subject, and the same term *supponit indifferenter pro entibus et non entibus.* The obvious translation in the context is:

> It seems that a common term which introduces something to function as the subject of a verb of the present tense is not restricted to existing things, but performs its subject-introduction on behalf of existing and non-existing things indiscriminately.

In another context, however, we might have rendered *supponit pro* as 'stands for' without bothering about the things being stood for having the role of subject. Only rarely are predicate terms said to supposit, and, it seems, mainly in England, but that seems to be a secondary extension of the use of *supponere*.[8]

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6) Cf. De Libera (1982b), 176.

7) Johannes Pagus, *Appellationes*, ed. De Libera (1984), 224. I have changed the edition's *supponitur* into *supponit.*

8) For an example, see the anonymous mid-thirteenth-century commentator on the *Prior Analytics* in ms Cambridge, *Peterhouse* 206, f. 100va: 'Sed adhuc dubium est de suppositione subiecti et praedicati in talibus 'tantum homo currit'. Et potest dici quod ratione exponentis negativae stat subiectum confuse tantum et praedicatum confuse et distributive. In hac enim, sc. 'aliud quam homo currit' stat li 'homo' confuse et distributive per virtutem de li 'aliud', et praedicatum stat determinate, quia negatio de li 'aliud' semper sistit circa materialem compositionem, unde idem est dicere 'aliud quam homo' et 'aliquid quod non est homo', et ita negatio de le 'aliud' non

I would now like to point to the use of *supponere* in a couple of somewhat different contexts that have not been mentioned so far in the debate about the origin of supposition theory, at least not as far as I remember.

1. One of the earliest (ca. 1090) commentaries on Boethius' *De topicis differentiis*, the *'Primum oportet'*, talks about *voces suppositae homini* without specifying whether the author is speaking of tokens of 'this man' or of proper names. In view of later developments in medieval logic, his use of *suppositae* deserves to be noticed.[9] I am not sure which sort of relation he thought obtains between the general term and its subordinate words—perhaps one of containing, but it is not easy to assign a precise sense to the container-contained metaphor as used by this author (whose name may have been Arnulphus); *inter alia*, he claims that the thing signified by a proper name is contained under the name.[10]

2. The earliest Latin commentary on the *Prior Analytics* (by Anonymus Aurelianensis III) can with some probability be assigned a date between 1160 and 1180.[11] The work knows nothing like supposition theory, not even under the

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attingit praedicatum. Praeposita igitur negatione sic 'nihil aliud quam homo currit' mutatur suppositio subiecti in confusam tantum et suppositio praedicati in confusam et distributivam.'

9) *Commentarium in Boethii De topicis differentiis*, ed. Hansen (2005), 67: "'risibile' quidem aequale est homini tantundem quantum et 'homo' significando, sed tamen seiunctum est a ratione substantiae hominis, id est a proprietate significationis vocum suppositarum homini, per hoc videlicet quod illae significant in eo quod quid, 'risibile' autem in quale." Cf. p. 63: 'id est: hanc vocem quae est 'quaestio', quae dicitur principium quantum ad voces sibi suppositas', and p. 112: 'Nota quod totum ut genus ab integro differat toto, in eo videlicet quod se sibi suppositis omni modo tribuit, integrum vero totum non omnino se suis attribuit partibus. Potes enim dicere: 'Homo est animal' et 'Homo est substantia animata sensibilis', sed non recte dices: 'Paries est domus' nec 'Paries est constans ex pariete et tecto et fundamento'.'

10) *Commentarium in Boethii De topicis differentiis*, ed. Hansen (2005), 87-88: 'QUIA OMNE ARTIFICIUM DISSERENDI CONTINETUR QUATTUOR FACULTATIBUS. Quasi dicat: Ideo dicendum est quae argumenta admittant sibi suas facultates, quia quattuor tantum facultates comprehendunt omnem locum et omnem syllogismum. Vel ad illud potest esse causae redditio quod dixit: quae facultas quibus uti noverit argumentis. Per 'QUATTUOR FACULTATES' habes idem quod per 'dialecticam, rhetoricam, philosophicam, sophisticam doctrinam', per OMNE vero ARTIFICIUM omnem locum et omnes syllogismos, harum videlicet quattuor facultatum significata. Differt autem ars et artifex et artificium; nam ipsae doctrinae quibus aliqua docemur dicuntur ars, artifex vero qui per eas aliquid agit, artificium vero omnis argumentatio. Quod autem dicit omne artificium quattuor facultatibus contineri ita accipe ut significata in suis significantibus continentur; omne enim significans suum continet significatum; ut res significata ab hoc nomine 'Lungomarius' continetur infra idem nomen, sic et in aliis.'

11) For this commentary, see S. Ebbesen, 'Analyzing Syllogisms *or* Anonymus Aurelianensis III—the (presumably) Earliest Extant Latin Commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and its Greek Model', in: *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen âge grec et latin* 37 (1981), 1-20 (rep. in Ebbesen (2008)). Yukio

guise of appellation, but the author does use *supponi* in a way that seems relevant to our topic, because he repeatedly uses it to say that some item is subsumed under or falls under another.[12]

In one place he wants to prove the validity of the syllogism:

> That every man is an animal is necessary,
> but that some body is not a man is necessary,
> therefore that some body is not an animal is necessary.

The way to prove it, he says, is so take something which is *suppositum minori extremo*, that is 'body', yet such that the middle term 'animal' can be universally denied of it. A stone fits the bill, and then you argue as follows:

> That every man is an animal is necessary,
> but that no stone is an animal is necessary,
> therefore that no stone is a man is necessary.

From which it follows that by necessity some body is not a man.

Iwakuma (Fukui Prefectural University) later did a preliminary transcription of the full text, and now Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist is preparing an edition. I am grateful to both of them for sharing their materials with me.

12) Anonymus Aurelianensis III, *Commentarium in Analytica priora*, ms Orléans *Bibliothèque municipale* 283, 188A: 'Sed necesse <30 a 9, *Aristoteles latinus* III, 20, 24-25>. Quasi: Non possunt probari per impossibile hii syllogismi de necessario, sed probantur per demonstrationem de exposito hoc modo: Proposito priori syllogismo de necesse in quarto modo secundae, causa expositionis ponatur aliquod *suppositum* minori extremitati a quo medium possit removeri universaliter, et fiat de illo *supposito* syllogismus in eadem figura et ceteris terminis eisdem, qui fiebat de minori extremo. Ut verbi gratia, cum hic sit quartus secundae 'Omnem hominem esse animal est necesse, sed quoddam corpus non esse animal est necesse, igitur quoddam corpus non esse hominem est necesse', probetur hoc modo: Ponatur causa manifestationis aliquod *suppositum* minori extremo quod est 'corpus', sed tale a quo medium possit universaliter removeri, velut 'lapis', et dicatur 'Omne animal esse hominem est necesse, et nullum lapidem esse animal est necesse, ergo nullum lapidem esse hominem <est necesse>', per quod demonstratur quoddam corpus non esse hominem necessario, quoniam hoc corpus, scil. lapis, ex necessitate non est homo.' Here, and in several similar cases, the author is clearly talking about what falls under a term. Less clear 184B: 'Per ostensionem <6.28 a 23>. Demonstratio per ostensionem dicitur cum ad probandum quod dixeras inducis *singularem suppositionem* rei quam primo per universale *supposueras*. Si ambigas ad probandum quod ex eis duabus 'omnis homo est animal' et 'omnis homo est risibilis' sequitur 'quoddam risibile est animal', inducas quod si omnis homo est animal, et omnis homo est risibilis, necessario hic homo Socrates erit simul et animal et risibile; ergo cum idem nunc sit hoc et illud, necessario quoddam animal est illud, et e converso. Quae demonstratio ostensio vocatur, quoniam quod dictum est generaliter *per suppositionem singularem* semper melius aperitur.'

This tallies very nicely with what Lambert of Lagny, Ligny or Auxerre says around the middle of the thirteenth century:[13]

> Dicuntur vero supposita quia supponuntur sive subiciuntur suis superioribus.

and is not very far from William of Sherwood's declaration that[14]

> Suppositio autem est ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio.

Although, as Kneepkens pointed out in 1987, medieval authors could, when necessary, keep various uses of technical terms apart, I am very tempted to think that the anonymous' use of *supponere* has to be added to the number of uses that influenced the use of the word in what became supposition theory.

At the same seventh European symposium at which Kneepkens presented his paper about supposition, I gave one about the theologian Stephen Langton,[15] who, I had recently discovered, had developed a fairly complex theological theory of supposition in the 1180s-90s, with a distinction between *suppositio essentialis* and *suppositio personalis* at its centre. I wondered aloud whether this meant that the logical distinction between *simplex* and *personalis* had its origin in theology. If this were so, the logical use of the notion of *suppositio* might be as late as the 90s, or possibly even later, depending on how many of De Rijk's early dates of logical treatises could be raised, and by how much. Of course, if *simplex* and *personalis* were artists' creations from the 70s or early 80s, Langton might have been inspired by the artists.

Langton's semantics and sentence analysis is very much influenced by that of the Porretans. I shall not catalogue the similarities, but just point to two important features of his theory, which both point back to the Porretans and forward to summulistic treatments of supposition. First, although he does not use the definition, for Langton supposition is definitely a *substantiva rei designatio*, as some logicians were to say. Only substantive nouns and substantivated adjectives supposit. When the talk is about created things, verbs predicate; but

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13) Lambertus de Lagny, *De Appellatione*, ed. De Libera (1981), 254-255: 'Dicuntur autem appellata eo quod appellantur sive nominantur a suis superioribus. Superiora enim de suis inferioribus praedicantur secundum nomen et secundum rationem. [...] Dicuntur vero supposita quia supponuntur sive subiciuntur suis superioribus, et dicuntur singularia eo quod nominant aliquid discretum et individuum quod uni singulariter convenit.'

14) William of Sherwood, *Introductiones in Logicam* V, ed. Brands and Kann (1995), 132.

15) Ebbesen (1987). Pinborg (1968) had already pointed to Langton's pupil, Andrew Sunesen, without, however, knowing that Andrew was dependent on Langton.

when it is about God, they couple—this to avoid introducing Aristotelian categories in propositions about God.[16] However, this divine coupling is the divine analogue of attributing a form to the subject, which is the job of ordinary *copulatio* in logic books.[17]

As shown by De Rijk in 1967, *appellare* and *appellatio* competed to some extent with *supponere* and *suppositio* in the works of early logicians, *appellatio* probably being the older term. In fact, it now seems reasonably certain that there was a time when only *appellatio* was a fully developed technical term in logic. Unlike *supponere, appellare* cannot be used to say 'provide a subject for the verb', but it shares with *supponere* the ability to indicate descent to something within the range of a term's signification. In some 'classical' thirteenth-century authors it comes to be reserved for the relationship between a term and presently existing items signified by it, but the wider use was not soon forgotten. John Pagus' *Appellationes* from the 1230s[18] is about what we would call supposition, not about appellation in the narrow sense, and the same holds for Lambert's *De appellatione* from about the middle of the century. Notice his explanation of *appellata and supposita*:[19]

> Dicuntur autem appellata eo quod appellantur sive nominantur a suis superioribus. Superiora enim de suis inferioribus praedicantur secundum nomen et secundum rationem. [...] Dicuntur vero supposita quia supponuntur sive subiciuntur suis superioribus.

Both designations are explained in terms of a superior–subordinate relationship, and Lambert simply takes *appellata* and *supposita* to be extensionally

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16) Actually, Langton is not consistent in avoiding *praedicare* when talking about the divine, whereas his pupil Andrew Sunesen is very consistent. See Ebbesen (1987). NB: Whereas verbs cannot supposit in Langton's and Sunesen's theory, nouns can both supposit and couple.

17) Already *Ars Meliduna*, ms Oxford, *Bodleian Library, Digby* 174, f. 217vb: 'Nos recipimus in his omnibus extensionem fieri appellationis, sicut et in nominibus illis quae substantiales vel naturales copulant proprietates.'

18) De Libera (1984), 193, follows Chenu in assigning a date of about 1230, but this presupposes that John's logical works were all written before he began to study theology. Heine Hansen, who is preparing an edition of John's commentary on the *Categories*, has pointed out to me that the commentary contains a number of references to theological authors, which suggests it was composed after John had commenced his study of theology. Assuming that he continued to teach the arts during his first years as a student of theology, we gain a wider span of time within which his logical works may have been written, roughly 1231-1241.

19) Lambert de Lagny, *De appellatione*, ed. De Libera (1981), 254-255. For the date, which is far from securely established, see De Libera (1981b).

equivalent. Only as an afterthought does he mention the newer, more restricted, use of *appellare*:[20]

> Properly speaking, however, only actually existing things are called appellata [...] and so it is correct when people say that appellation is supposition for existing things.

About 1240 Robert Kilwardby still calls the two rules that a verb of past tense ampliates the subject to past things and one of future tense to future things *regulae appellationum*, though he phrases them in *suppositio*-language. Thus the one about ampliation to the past runs:[21]

> Terminus communis supponens verbo de praeterito potest supponere pro hiis qui sunt vel pro hiis qui fuerunt.

Elsewhere, though, he refers to the same rules under the name of *regulae suppositionum*.[22]

A similar use of *regula appellationum* appears in the *Elenchi*-commentary of Anonymus Monacensis, which probably dates from the second quarter of the thirteenth century.[23] The indiscriminate use of *appellare* and *supponere* only seems to disappear after the middle of the thirteenth century.

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20) Lambert de Lagny, *De appellatione*, ed. De Libera (1981), 255, continuation of the quotation above: 'Sciendum autem quod proprie loquendo non dicuntur appellata nisi sint actualiter existentia, appellatur enim proprie quod est et non quod non est, et ideo bene dicitur quod appellatio est pro existentibus suppositio.'

21) Robertus Kilwardby, *Commentum in Analytica Priora*, in: ms Cambridge, *Peterhouse* 205, ff. 88vb-89ra: 'Et potest dici quod duae priores instantiae multiplices sunt [secundum] per *regulas appellationum*. Haec enim 'nullus senex erit puer' multiplex est ex eo quod hoc subiectum 'senex' potest stare pro sene qui est vel qui erit. Si pro sene qui est, sic est sensus 'nullus senex qui est erit puer', sic est vera, et sic convertitur, et hoc modo est sensus 'nullus puer erit senex qui est'. Si pro sene qui erit, sic est sensus 'nullus senex qui erit erit puer', et sic est falsa et potest converti. [...] Similiter dicendum est de hac instantia 'nullus puer fuit senex' per *illam regulam appellationum*: Terminus communis *supponens* verbo de praeterito potest *supponere* pro hiis qui sunt vel pro hiis qui fuerunt.'

22) Robertus Kilwardby, *Commentum in Sophisticos Elenchos*, mss Cambridge, *Peterhouse* 205, f. 335rb and Paris, *BnF. lat.* 16619, f. 62vb: 'Quaeritur etiam *de duabus regulis suppositionum* quae iam positae sunt, sc. quod terminus communis non restrictus etc. *supponens* verbo de praeterito potest *supponere* pro hiis quae sunt vel pro hiis quae fuerunt, similiter terminus communis *supponens* verbo de futuro potest *supponere* pro hiis quae sunt vel {vel: et *CP*} erunt.'

23) Anonymus Monacensis, *Commentum in Sophisticos Elenchos*, mss Admont, *Stiftsbibliothek* 241, f. 17vb, and München, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, *clm* 14246, f. 8rb: 'Sed contra. In appellationibus habemus regulam hanc quod terminus communis non habens vim ampliandi etc. supponens

2. Problems of Chronology

De Rijk in the 1960s tried to impose some chronological order on the mass of undated texts with which he was dealing. While some of his results stand, others do not. His methodology was all right, because it was and is the only one we have for such tasks. He relied to some extent on the date of manuscripts to establish *termini ante quos*—a text must have been composed no later than the time it was entered into an existing manuscript. The problem with this approach is, of course, that dating manuscripts is still a sub-scientific art. We are waiting for some method from the natural sciences that will allow us establish the year the animal was felled that provided the raw material for the parchment. That will give us a secure *terminus post quem* for the execution of the manuscript, and a probable *terminus ante quem*, since we may assume that most parchment was used within a decade of its production, I believe. Stocking such a precious commodity for years instead of buying just what you need here and now would appear to be bad economy.

Next, De Rijk tried to anchor his chronology by attributing particular works to particular persons whose careers were somewhat known. That yielded a few fixed points to be used in connection with the third part of his work.

The third task was to establish a relative chronology of the texts, based on the tacit assumption that there would be a linear development of doctrine. Again, he was perfectly aware that doctrinal development may not always be perfectly linear, if for nothing else, because even if the development did proceed linearly in each and every sub-branch of the big intellectual community, there might be a different pace in the several sub-branches. Toulouse, for example, might need a couple of decades to get abreast of new developments in Paris. But rarely was it possible for him to establish with certainty the place of origin of a relevant text.

People who are not trained as historians or philologists tend to brush aside the problems involved in dating, and simply accept what the most authoritative historian or philologist says. In this case it means that very few outside the circle of the European Symposia know how fragile the chronology is, and which of De Rijk's assumptions have been supported or undermined by later research.

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verbo de praesenti non habenti vim ampliandi restringitur ad supponendum pro eis quae sunt sive ad praesentes; ergo cum dicitur 'laborans sanus est', ille terminus 'laborans' pro praesentibus solum supponit, et ita non habebit duo tempora.' See context in Ebbesen (1997), 149.

One of the anchors of the chronology was Guillelmus Arnaldi's commentary on Peter of Spain's *Summulae*, which, supposedly, could not be later than 1248, whence a date in the 1230s was a reasonable estimate for the composition of the *Summulae*, so much the more as De Rijk also found an anonymous commentary, the *'Cum a facilioribus'*, which seemed to be earlier than William's, and thus could hardly be later than ca. 1240.[24] I expressed my doubts about the date of Guillelmus Arnaldi in 1970, because the format of his commentary appeared to me too similar to works from the 1270s.[25] Nobody noticed a young scholar's squeak. Some more—but not all—noticed when some years later Gauthier demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Arnaldi in question was not the one De Rijk had assumed, but someone who worked in the 1290s.[26] Unfortunately, that left us with no interesting *terminus ante quem* for Peter's *Summulae* and the commentaries on it, and we cannot even use any knowledge about Peter's life to date his work, for Angel d'Ors has taught us not to identify the author with Pope John XXI or some Portuguese scholar who may or may not have been identical with the pope. D'Ors has proposed other possible life-stories for our author, but none that carries total conviction.[27] Consequently, we simply have neither a *terminus ante quem* nor a *terminus post quem* for Peter of Spain's *Summulae.* The 1230s are still possible, but so are the 40s, even the 50s—or the 20s.

A second anchor for chronology was the theological *Fallacies* of Master William, and so far it stays in its anchor position. De Rijk's proposal to identify the author with Willelmus de Montibus has been accepted by Iwakuma, and, as such things go, it may be considered fairly safe. But this almost certainly means that the work was composed after 1186 when William began to teach theology in Lincoln.[28] As a mode of the fallacy of figure of speech William mentions univocation, which is *eiusdem dictionis in eadem significatione et terminatione varia appellatio*, and he also mentions that the appellation may be restricted or ampliated. His theological examples do not offer themselves very easily to analysis by means of standard supposition rules, but there can be little doubt that he knew a secular logic that called variation of appellation 'univocation' and put it under figure of speech. William's definition of univocation is very

24) De Rijk (1970), 17-18.

25) Ebbesen and Pinborg (1970), 44 n.

26) Thomae de Aquino, *Expositio libri Peryermeneias* (1989), 69*-72*.

27) D'Ors (1997), (2001), (2003).

28) Iwakuma (1993), 1-4. In ms Cambridge, *Jesus College* Q.B.17, William's *Fallaciae* occurs together with theological works by Willelmus de Montibus.

close to that found in *Tractatus de univocatione Monacensis*,[29] which, of course, is nice for the relative chronologist.

A third anchor is *Ars Meliduna* because of a reference to King Louis of France and an unnamed bad king of England. Louis, de Rijk realized, must be Louis VII, who unfortunately reigned for an intolerably long time (1137-1180). The uncomplimentary reference to the king of England, however, suggests a date after the early 1150s.[30] Anyway, we have 1180 as a reasonably certain *terminus ante quem.* Now, the author of the *Ars* does not speak of *suppositio*, but of *appellatio*, and he does have rules about restriction and ampliation of appellation, and indicates that there was some discussion about the matter, so that he cannot have been the first to introduce the subject. However, he only has a very rudimentary terminology for types of appellation: thus a term may be put or taken *confuse* or *discrete*, and occasionally the notion of appellation is introduced in that context, as when he says:[31]

> ibi ponitur nomen confuse, id est non pro aliquo suorum appellatorum.

On one occasion, at least, de Rijk put the *Ars Meliduna* as early as the middle of the twelfth century,[32] but I believe most scholars would now agree that ca. 1175 is a safer guess.

Other of de Rijk's suggested attributions of works to definite persons may be considered obsolete. Anonymus Digbeianus' mutilated commentary on the *Elenchi* cannot plausibly be attributed to Edmund of Abingdon, who, according to Roger Bacon, was the first to lecture on the book in Oxford, and the *Abstractiones* of master Richard cannot plausibly be attributed to Richard Fishacre.[33] Nor can *Summae Metenses* be considered the work of an early

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29) Iwakuma (1993), 3.

30) De Rijk (1962-1967), II/1, 280-281.

31) *Ars Meliduna*, ms Oxford, *Bodleian Library, Digby* 174, f. 218va. Cf. f. 225ra: 'Ad id etiam improbandum sufficit quod iste terminus 'coloratum hac albedine' nihil discrete supponit, unde potius quoddam commune significat quam singulare.' *Poni* or *accipi confuse* vs. *infinite* occurs in several places. F. 227va: 'Quae vero unum terminorum sumit discrete, alterum communiter, a communi denominabitur, ut 'Socrates vel asinus currit' indefinita est.'

32) De Rijk (1982), 165.

33) As done by De Rijk in his *Logica modernorum* (1962-1967), II/1, 72-74. The two identifications were linked to each other. Ms Oxford, *Bodleian Library, Digby* 24 contains both texts. Having identified Richard as Richard Fishacre, De Rijk proposed to identify Anonymus Digbeianus = SE59 in Ebbesen (1993) with Edmund, because he and Fishacre had been in contact. I believe Anonymus Digbeianus' commentary is no earlier than the middle of the thirteenth century.

thirteenth-century Nicholas of Metz; it is much more likely by a mid-century Nicholas of Paris.[34]

Though it could not be linked to any definite person, the *Dialectica Monacensis* became another important anchor for the chronology of supposition, because it has a fairly well-developed account of the matter, and it was placed in the 1170s by de Rijk.[35] So, the more primitive stages of supposition- or appellation theory probably lay in the preceding decades. However, Braakhuis, myself and Iwakuma soon came to suspect that the date was too early by some decades. Braakhuis pushed it towards the end of the twelfth or very early thirteenth century. I myself inclined towards a date close to 1220, and Iwakuma in 1993 took a sort of middle position: '1190s if not later'.[36]

Among my reasons for wanting a late date is the occurrence in the treatise on fallacies of the doctrine of causes of appearance and non-existence or falsity, which does not occur in any work surely dated to the twelfth century, but became a standard item in thirteenth-century theory of fallacies.[37]

It is notable that the same manuscript that transmits the *Dialectica Monacensis* contains another set of treatises, which I shall call *Tractatus Monacenses*, written in the same hand, and sharing numerous traits of formulation and doctrine with the *Dialectica*, both in the field of supposition and in having the notions of *causa apparentiae et non existentiae* for the fallacies.[38] The two works must come from the same environment and be approximately contemporaneous. Interestingly, and disconcertingly, the *Tractatus Monacenses* uses the river Elbe instead of the standard Parisian Seine in the example *Albea currit, ergo habet pedes*.[39] De Rijk had claimed the *Dialectica Monacensis* for an Englishman with contacts in Chartres and Paris, but on extremely slender grounds.[40] The occurrence of the Elbe in a related text suggests that we should consider the northern part of the Holy Roman Empire as a possible place of origin.

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34) De Rijk (1962-1967), II/1, 450-452; Braakhuis (1979), I, 317-328.

35) De Rijk (1962-1967), II/1, 414.

36) Braakhuis (1979), 1, 427, n. 12; Iwakuma (1993), 4, n. 16.

37) A thirteenth-century date also makes the quotation of *Liber de Sex Principiis* mentioned by De Rijk (1962-1967), II/1, 410 unproblematic. For the use of *causa apparentiae & non-existentiae*, see the table in the appendix.

38) *Tractatus Monacensis* occupy ff. 121r-141r of ms München, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, *clm* 14763, in which *Dialectica Monacensis* occupies ff. 89r-121r.

39) Anonymus, *Tractatus Monacensis, Fallaciae*, ms München, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, *clm* 14763, f. 123vb.

40) De Rijk (1962-1967), II/1, 414.

Moving the *Dialectica Monacensis* up in time has serious consequences for the birthdate of supposition theory. It was supposed to be a very early instance of a fairly developed lore of supposition. A late date not only saves us from believing that its author was precocious, it also makes it slightly less of a mystery why the *Summa 'In omni doctrina'*[41] totally ignores supposition, although it would seem to belong somewhere in the first half of the thirteenth century.[42]

Conclusion

A host of questions concerning the dates of the relevant texts remain unresolved, but this is what I think the available evidence points to at this moment:

The main outlines of the story about supposition remain as in 1967, but the dates change. First, the birth of supposition theory took place in the very late twelfth century. The first signs of what was to come appear in the 1170s, but in logic centered round the notion of appellation, while supposition was becoming a key notion in theology.[43] A stage with a fairly developed terminology for types of supposition is not reached till about the 1190s, when also *suppositio* begins to outmanœuvre *appellatio*, though this was to be a slow process. The majority of our early texts that teach or employ supposition, English and continental alike, were composed in the thirteenth century.

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41) Anonymus, *Summa 'In omni doctrina'*, ed. Bos (2001).

42) Bos (2001), 6, proposes a date between 1200 and 1220, but I am afraid that is too early. There are references to the *Posterior Analytics* in II/1.1.1, 95, and II/1.1.5, 97; and to *Physics* II in III. 0, p. 134. In II/1.1, 85, we find 'Nullus enim artifex probat sua principia', which seems to indicate a date when both *Posterior Analytics* and *Physics* I were commonly read. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiarum* I, q. 1, a. 3: 'sicut nec aliquis artifex potest probare sua principia', Boethius of Dacia, *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum* ed. Sajó (1954). I. 12, 152-154 'Quaeritur utrum aliquis artifex possit probare sua principia si sibi negantur. [...] Item, nullus artifex potest probare aliquid contra illum qui nihil sibi concedit'. The debate in Boethius (and others from the second half of the century) is linked to Averroes' discussion in his commentary on *Physics* I, comm. 8.

43) I am inclined to think that the *Summa Zwettlensis* is a work from about the 1170s. Häring's date 'before 1150' rests on his very doubtful attribution of the work to one Peter of Poitiers/Vienna. See Valente (2008a), 25. If I am right, the *Summa* is approximately contemporary with Peter of Poitiers' *Sententiae*, in which *supponere* is used in a relevant way, but without any developed system of types of supposition.

Finally, I think that although some authors may have had very clear ideas of which of the many uses of *supponere* was relevant in each particular context, they would generally be influenced both by the grammatical 'putting as a subject'-tradition, the logical one of saying that what may be subsumed under a term *supponitur* under it, and the metaphysical thesis that bearers of forms *supponuntur* under their forms.

Appendix

The following table lists a number of commentaries on the *Sophistici Elenchi* and treatises on fallacies, whether separate of parts of *summulae.* Column 2 gives the number the work has in the list of texts on fallacies in Ebbesen (1993). Column 3 offers my best guess at a date. Column 4 registers whether the work uses either of the terms *appellatio* and *suppositio* in the technical sense. Column 5 whether the text lists univocation as a type of the fallacy of figure of speech (*figura dictionis*). Column 6 whether, in the description of figure of speech, specific types of supposition, such as *confuse* and *determinate*, are referred to. Column 7 whether the text assigns a *causa apparentiae* (= *principium motivum)* and a *causa non-existentiae* (= *causa* or *principium falsitatis* or *defectus*) to the several fallacies.

Among other things, the table shows that having univocation as a type of figure of speech is restricted to a very tiny group of texts, which may, therefore, be assumed to be roughly contemporary.

A	= *appellatio*
S	= *suppositio*
S/A	= both *suppositio* and *appellatio* used
(A)	= a single relevant use of *appellatio* occurs
c. a. / non-e. & fals.	= *causa apparentiae* and both *causa non-existentiae* and *causa falsitatis* occur
p. mot.	= *principium motivum*

1. Name	2. SE	3. Date	4. *suppositio / appellatio*	5. *univocatio under f.d.*	6. *confuse & sim.* in *f.d.*	7. *causa aparentiae / non -existentiae*
Glosae SE	5	1140-60	—	—	—	—
Summa SE	6	1140-60	—	—	—	—
Anonymus Parisiensis	8	1140-70	— *(A)*	—	—	—
Anon. Aur. I	13	1160-80	—	—	—	—
Anon. Aur. II	14	1160-80	—	—	—	—
Anon. Cantabr.	15	1160-90	—	—	—	—
Fallaciae Vindobonenses	16	1160-90	— *(A)*	—	—	—
Introductiones Parisienses[44]	19	1190-1210	*S*	—	—	—
Fallaciae M. Willelmi	20	1186-1200	*A*	+	—	—
Fallaciae Parvipontanae	17	1190-1210[45]	*A /S*	(—)[46]	—	—
Fallaciae Londinenses	18	1190-1210	*S*	—	+	—
Fallaciae Lemovicenses	23	1190-1210	*S/A*	+	+	—
Dialectica Monac.	27	1200-20	*S*	+	+	*c. a. / non-e & fals.*
Tractatus Monac.	28	1200-20	*S*	+	+	*c. a./ non-e & fals.*
Summa 'In omni doctrina'	29	?	—	—	—	*c. a. / fals.*

[44] Dated ca. 1170 by De Rijk (1962-1967), II/1, 447, but on the slenderest of grounds (including an invalid argument from the way 'Socrates' is abbreviated ms Paris, *BnF. lat.* 15170). There is a fairly developed system of types of supposition, which is distinguished from appellation in the way that many thirteenth-century authors do. The fallacy of figure of speech 'provenit ex variata suppositione vel ex variato modo supponendi vel copulandi', which is close to the formulations used by *Fallaciae Lemovicenses* and *Dialectica Monacensis* (see Ebbesen and Iwakuma (1993), 28 with references in footnote).

[45] De Rijk (1962-1967), I, 152 says 'Internal evidence makes me date this work in the last decades of the twelfth century.' He does not, however, say what the internal evidence is.

[46] Mentioned but rejected.

Table (*cont.*)

1. Name	2. SE	3. Date	4. *suppositio* / *appellatio*	5. *univocatio* under *f.d.*	6. *confuse & sim.* in *f.d.*	7. *causa aparentiae* / *non -existentiae*
Introductiones Antiquae	30	1220-60	*S*[47]	—	—	*c. a. / fals.*
Petrus Hisp., *Summulae*	32	1220-50	*S*	—	(—)[48]	*p. mot. / defectus*
Anon. Monac., *Comm. SE*	34	1230-50	*S/(A)*	—	+	*p. mot.*
Grosseteste (?) *Comm. SE*	31	1230s?	— *(?)*	—	—	*c. a. / non-e.*
Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae	33	1220-60	*S*	—	+	*c. a. / non-e.*
Sherwood, *Introd.*	36	1230s?	*S*	—	—	*c. a./non-e.*
Kilwardby, *Comm. SE*	35	ca. 1240	*S*	—	+	*c. a. / non-e.*
Nicolaus Parisiensis, *Summae Metenses*	42	1240-60	*S*	+	+	*c.a./non-e & fals.*
Nicolaus Parisiensis, *Comm. SE*	41	1240-60	*S*	—	—	*p. mot. & c. a. / defectus*
Ripoll Compendium	40	1240-60	*S*	—	—	*p. mot.*
Bacon, *Summulae*	43	1250-55	*S*	—	+	*c. a./non-e.*
Robertus, *Comm. SE*	45	1250-70	*S*	—	+	*c.a.*
Robertus de e Aucumpno, *Comm. SE*	48	1250-70	*S*	—	+	*c. a. / non-e.*

47) Not in section on fallacies.

48) Mentioned but rejected.

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Postscript

After this article was handed in for publication I discovered evidence that Anonymus Cantabrigiensis' commentary on *Sophistici Elenchi* must have been composed no earlier than 1204, not betwen 1160 and 1190, as proposed in the table on p. 74.

The edition of Pagus on the *Categories* referred to as forthcoming in footnote 18 has now appeared. See H. Hansen, *John Pagus on Aristotle's Categories. A Study and Edition of the Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series I, XIV, Leuven University Press 1912.